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Abstract
This paper investigates how concealment costs of transfer pricing and the prob-
ability of detection a¤ect transfer pricing and rm behavior. We nd that transfer
pricing in intermediate production factors does not a¤ect real activity of a multi-
national rm if the rms concealment e¤ort as well as the probability of being
audited by tax authorities are conditioned on the amount of shifted prots. If tax
authorities rely on the standard OECD arms-length principle instead by reacting
to a deviation of the transfer price from the market price, the multinational will
for tax reasons adjust its production structure. A policy implication of the paper
is that it should be preferable to condition audits on the amount of income shifted
rather than on the distortion of the transfer price proper. Another policy nding is
that improving the quality of tax law might be superior to higher detection e¤ort.
The former reduces prot shifting and concealment e¤ort, whereas the latter leads
to more wasteful use of resources on concealment and has an ambiguous e¤ect on
prots shifted.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the nancial crisis there has been a debate over corporate tax revenue and
the fact that many multinational corporations pay very little tax in high-tax countries.
The use of sophisticated tax-planning schemes and transfer pricing have been at the
forefront of this discussion. One example is the Reuters report on Starbucks (Bergin,
2012). Despite having almost one-third of the UK co¤ee shop market, Starbucks has paid
corporation tax only once in the past 15 years. Yet, transcripts of investor and analyst
calls over 12 years show Starbucks o¢ cials regularly talked about the UK business as
protable,said they were very pleased with it, or even cited it as an example to follow
for operations back home in the United States. In response to the Reuters report on
Starbucks, a Starbucks spokeswoman said by email to Reuters that (Bergin, 2012, p. 2):
We seek to be good taxpayers and to pay our fair share of taxes ... We dont write this
tax code; we are obligated to comply with it. And we do.
In the public debate, policymakers and international organizations such as the OECD
have voiced concern that tax planning and tax evasion by multinationals through transfer
pricing and prot shifting generate unintended competitive advantages over domestic
companies, which could lead to the distortion of investment decisions as well as posing
issues of fairness.1 The OECD in a report on base erosion and prot shifting even
argues that a failure to take action against prot shifting by multinationals would put
the integrity of the corporate income taxat stake (OECD, 2013, p. 8).
Multinationals in e¤ect report income by choosing prices on intra-rm trade. By
selecting to overinvoice (underinvoice) sales to a¢ liates in high-tax (low-tax) countries,
multinationals can shift prots to low-tax countries and thus save taxes. For instance,
royalties for using a brand name or a patent do not have an obvious market parallel;
hence, multinationals have considerable discretion in setting prices on such transactions.
Although there clearly is a grey area between strictly legal tax planning and illegal tax
evasion, multinationals also calculate and may be willing to take the risk of being caught
and ned for trade mis-pricing.
Policy makers naturally ponder how they can go about curbing the undesirable prot
shifting behavior on the part of multinationals, while at the same time interfering as
little as possible with multinationalsproduction activity. This is the starting point of
the present article.
A standard assumption in the literature on multinationals and prot shifting is that
mis-declaration of a transfer price is costly. Two di¤erent modelling approaches have been
adopted in the literature. In the rst approach, following the tradition of Allingham and
1Actually, another worry is that transfer pricing in production factors also triggers ine¢ ciencies in
the production structure within multinationals. That most transfer-price manipulation takes place in
intangibles is therefore often explained by saying that multinationals would like to avoid distortions in
production. Of course, valuing intangibles is also a more fuzzy a¤air.
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Sandmo, the rm maximizes expected prots taking into account a probability of audit
and a penalty for cheating. The issue then is whether the probability of a ne depends
on the di¤erence between the true price and the deviation from the true price (see, e.g.,
Kant, 1988)2 or on total prots shifted (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972).3 In both
variants, the probability of detection is endogenous. In our model below, we include that
the detection probability increases with detection e¤ort exerted by tax authorities, but
decreases with concealment e¤ort of rms. The second, alternative approach is to let
the rm incur costly concealment e¤orts related to the use of accountants and lawyers to
hide misdeclaration. We capture this e¤ect by adding a cost function that depends on
the level of rms concealment e¤ort.
More specically, we set up a model, in which an internal shipment between a multi-
nationals a¢ liates needs to be priced. A certain level of the transfer price is considered
appropriate by the tax authorities, and a deviation from this level may with some like-
lihood trigger an audit and an associated ne. We demonstrate that the choice of the
transfer price and its e¤ect on intra-rm trade and investment will depend on the prob-
ability of detection and thus on the measure, on which tax authorities base their audit.
Two possibilities are examined: On one hand, authorities may condition on the amount
of prot shifted (i.e., evaded tax base) or on total tax savings (i.e., evaded tax pay-
ments); we show that this will leave investment and production decisions una¤ected. On
the other hand, authorities may condition an inspection on the deviation of the transfer
price from the appropriate arms-length price; this will trigger distortive responses in
the investment and production of the multinational. A main implication of analysis in
the paper therefore is that it should be preferable to condition audits on the amount
of income shifted rather than on the deviation from the market price(OECDs arms
length principle). The former rule leaves rmsinvestment behavior undistorted, whilst
the latter may entail an e¢ ciency loss.4
A second set of results ensues from analyzing the e¤ect of government action against
prot shifting. We point out that increasing the detection e¤ort by tax authorities will
have an ambiguous e¤ect on prot shifting. Higher detection e¤ort directly increases the
detection probability, but also fosters rmsconcealment e¤ort. The latter counteracts
the e¤ect of a higher detection e¤ort. Furthermore, higher concealment e¤ort will imply a
greater waste of resources from societys point of view. Therefore, it might be preferable to
improve the quality of transfer pricing regulation in the tax law. Tighter transfer pricing
regulation, for example by requiring corporations to document that the chosen transfer
2Along the lines of OECDs comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, cf OECD (2010).
3This would be more in line with OECDs comparable prot method.
4Becker and Davies (2013) propose in a recent working paper a negotiation-based model of tax-
induced transfer pricing, where a high-tax jurisdiction sets transfer pricing requirements to avoid a low-
tax jurisdiction to enter negotiations on transfer prices. Their paper complements ours in the attempt
to understand the setting of transfer prices and the role of tax authorities.
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price is in line with the arms length principle, renders concealment more expensive and
so reduces concealment e¤ort, leading to less prot shifting and less waste of resources
on concealment.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present our model and study how
a multinational rm behaves, if it must exert e¤ort to conceal tax evasion by transfer
pricing, and if there is a likelihood of an audit plus a ne related to abusive transfer
pricing. We derive a condition under which transfer pricing will not a¤ect the rms
investments nor the use of intermediate inputs.
In section 3 we analyze how di¤erent measures that tax authorities can apply to con-
dition an audit on, will a¤ect rm behavior. We point out that a rms real activities
remain unchanged, if the probability of detection depends on evaded taxes or on unde-
clared tax bases, but that real activity will respond, if the probability of an audit depends
on deviation from the true price of the traded good.
A brief comparative-static analysis is conducted in section 4 in order to understand
how the intensity of inspection on the part of authorities as well as the quality of the tax
law will a¤ect the extent of abusive transfer pricing and multinationalse¤ort directed at
concealment. Finally, section 5 o¤ers some conclusions.
2 The model
Consider a multinational corporation (MNC) with two a¢ liates, one located in a high-tax
country B (a¢ liate B) and one in a low-tax country A (a¢ liate A). Tax rates are dened
as tA < tB so that the MNC would like to shift prot from a¢ liate B to a¢ liate A. The
a¢ liate in country A produces an intermediate input good S at marginal cost q using
a linear production technology, and ships the intermediate good at price G + q to the
a¢ liate in country B.5
Firm B wants to conceal the true cost of the input good S and does so by incurring
costly concealment e¤ort c. Tax authorities try to reveal the true nature of the transac-
tion by exerting detection e¤ort d. If the tax authorities in country B detect that the
intermediate good is overinvoiced to shift income, rm B is ned. We dene the ne as
 = (G;S);  is non-decreasing in its arguments.6 Further, let p = p(G;S; c; d) 2 [0; 1]
5Alternatively, a¢ liate A could be interpreted as a vendor that buys the intermediate good from an
unrelated third party at price q and re-sells it (without adding any value to the good) to a¢ liate B with
a surcharge G at price G+ q.
6The expression for the ne (G;S) can be made to encompass the way nes for distorted transfer
pricing often work in practice. Dene by z the ne rate set by the country which is cheated against,
i.e. the high tax country; it measures the required ne payment for every dollar underreported by the
subsidiary in B. We take z to be greater than unity (z > 1). If the entity in B is detected, the ne z is
levied on the size of the shipment S times the overpricing G; times the high tax rate tB , i.e., altogether
zSGtB .
If tax authorities in country B detect abusive transfer pricing and adjust taxable income of the sub-
sidiary there, it is possible that the authorities in country A will undertake a so-called corresponding
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be the probability of detection. p is increasing in mispricing G, the detection e¤ort d of
the tax authorities, and the level of the intermediate good S; whereas we assume it to be
decreasing in the rms concealment e¤ort c. Thus, we have pG; pS; pd > 0 and pc < 0.
We shall without consequence for any of the results assume that both the concealment
costs and the ne are tax deductible in order to simplify the analysis.
It is costly for the rm to exert e¤ort c to conceal transfer pricing and we denote the
concealment e¤ort cost function by e = e(c; l), where l is a parameter for the quality
of transfer pricing regulation in the tax code. A high l increases the e¤ort-related costs
of concealing mispricing. Thus, ecl > 0. We also make the reasonable assumption that
concealment costs are convex in concealment e¤ort, i.e., ec; ecc > 0: It should be noted
that countries di¤er substantially when it comes to transfer pricing regulation. Some
countries do not have explicit rules in domestic law for transfer pricing regulation, but
rely on the OECD double tax convention and the arms length principle. Other countries
have the arms length principle stated explicitly in domestic law. This group of countries
typically can also require that the rm document the transfer price during a public audit.
Finally, some countries have transfer pricing regulation that requires rms that trade with
related companies to document how the transfer price is calculated. Such documentation
must either be submitted with the rms annual return or submitted upon request.7
The a¢ liate in country B uses the imported intermediate input good S jointly with
capital K to produce a nal good y, which is sold in a competitive market in coun-
try B at a constant selling price that is normalized to one. In order to ensure inner
solutions, we assume a standard neoclassical production function y = FB(K;S) with
FBK ; F
B
S ; FBKK ; FBSS > 0 and impose the Inada conditions, i.e., limK!0; limS!0 ! 1
and limK!1 = limS!1 = 0.
We shall in line with most of the literature on (multinational) rms (see, e.g., Ethier,
1986; Tirole, 1988), assume that the MNC is risk neutral and maximizes expected global
after-tax prots. In order to conform to standard OECD corporate income tax codes, we
assume that costs of equity are not tax deductible, and for simplicity we assume that the
rm is nanced by equity only. These assumptions are not restrictive and do not a¤ect
our results, because the incentive to shift prots is present whether the rm is debt or
correction of the MNCs taxable income in that country. The extent to which this is expected to happen
can be captured by the parameter x (0  x  1). Alternatively, x may stand for the before-tax net
present value of every dollar, by which taxable income in A is lowered after a possibly lengthy process.
If taxable income in B is corrected, the expected decline in taxable income in A thus amounts to xSG,
giving rise to a tax rebate of value xSGtA. Overall, if detected, the MNC as a whole can reckon with an
additional net tax of (ztB   xtA)SG.
So, if the function  is understood to subsume the di¤erence (ztB   xtA) between ne per dollar
underreported in B and associated expected corresponding correction in A, taxable income correction in
practice should be covered by the (G;S) expression. Explicitly taking these mechanisms into account
would have implications for the comparative statics analysis in section 4, though.
7In countries with high quality transfer pricing regulation, there may be penalties for wrong, missing
or incomplete documentation of how the transfer price has been calculated. This ne would come in
addition to nes related to misdeclaration of taxable income (see Lohse et al. 2012).
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equity nanced.
In our analysis, we shall assume that all decisions of the MNC are centralized. It
has been shown in the literature that a MNC may benet from delegating decisions to a
de-centralized authority level by allowing subsidiaries to set prices or quantities in local
markets under oligopoly. The theoretical underpinnings of this is the delegation principle
in the industrial organization (IO) literature, where a principal may benet from hiring
an agent and giving him/her the incentive to maximize something other than the welfare
of the principal.8 As shown by Nielsen et al. (2008), if tax di¤erentials across countries
are large, centralized decision making is better than a decentralised structure even under
oligopoly. In our setting, we have assumed perfect competition in order to focus purely
on the tax incentives. This means that there are no strategic gains from delegating
decisions.9
We can express after-tax prot in a¢ liate A as
A = (1  tA)[(G+ q)S   qS] = (1  tA)GS:
If abusive transfer pricing is not detected by the tax authorities, the after-tax prot Bn
in a¢ liate B is
Bn = (1  tB)[FB(K;S)  (G+ q)S   e(c; l)] RK;
where R is the constant world-market interest rate.
In the case that tax authorities detect that the transfer price deviates from the arms
length price (market price), a¢ liate Bs after-tax prot (Bd ) is given by
Bd = (1  tB)[FB(K;S)  (G+ q)S   e(c; l)  (G;S)] RK:
The risk neutral MNC maximizes global expected net-of-tax income, that is,
max
c;K;G;S
E[] = A + [1  p(G;S; c; d)]Bn + p(G;S; c; d)Bd (1)
= (1  tB)[FB(K;S)  qS] RK + (tB   tA)GS   (1  tB)C(G;S; c; d; l)
where we have dened C(G;S; c; d; l)  e(c; l) + p(G;S; c; d)(G;S) as the sum of the
concealment e¤ort cost and the expected ne, and where the term (tB  tA)GS is the net
tax gain from shifting prot to country A.10
8See Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) for an analysis.
9Yet, even if we had assumed oligopoly, there is not necessarily any reason why MNCs cannot use
multiple transfer prices for di¤erent roles. As a matter of fact, most countries do not have rules that ban
the use of two books precisely because of the multiple roles transfer prices may have. Cf., for example,
Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller (2012).
10Note that the formulation entails that there is a tax rebate for both concealment e¤ort cost e(c; l)
and the ne (G;S).
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Optimal concealment e¤ort c is determined by
 (1  tB)@C
@c
= 0 , ec(c; l) =  pc(G;S; c; d)  (G;S): (2)
The rm balances marginal e¤ort costs of its investment into concealing (left hand side)
and the marginal return from reducing expected nes on abusive transfer pricing, that is
to the decrease in the detection probability times the ne payment; see the right hand
side of equation (2) (and note that pc < 0).
The rst-order condition for capital investment K can be written as
FBK (K;S) =
R
(1  tB) : (3)
The left-hand side is the marginal productivity of capital (FBK ), while the right-hand side
is the e¤ective marginal cost of capital. Since equity is not tax deductible, the required
return to capital is higher than the interest rate R: From equation (3), it can be seen
that trade mispricing (G 6= 0) only a¤ects the demand for capital via the use of the
intermediate good S in the production function.
Maximizing expected prot E[] w.r.t. the optimal transfer price (G) yields
(tB   tA)S = (1  tB)@C
@G
; (4)
which shows that the transfer price should be increased until the marginal tax savings
from transfer pricing (left-hand side) is equal to the after-tax marginal concealment costs
(right-hand side).
The rst-order condition for S is given by
FBS =

q   (tB   tA)G
1  tB +
@C
@S

: (5)
In optimum, the rm balances the marginal after-tax income from sales of the nal good
in country B (left-hand side) to the net e¤ective after-tax marginal costs of using the
intermediate input S: The marginal costs of S consist of the three terms in the squared
bracket. The rst is the true resource costs q of the input good S. The two last terms
in the squared bracket give the net after-tax cost of using S to shift prot. The rst of
these terms, (tB   tA)G= (1  tB), is the net tax savings of a marginal increase in the
imports of the intermediate good S.11 The last term is the increase in concealment costs
that follows from a marginal increase in S (that is, @C=@S).
Making use of equation (4) to substitute for (tB   tA)=(1   tB), we can rewrite the
11Increasing S is tantamount to broadening of the base for distorted transfer pricing.
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rst-order condition (5) as
FBS = q +

@C
@S
  G
S
@C
@G

= q   C(G;S; c; d; l)
S
 ("CS   "CG) ; (6)
where we dene the concealment-cost elasticities of input manipulation and trade mis-
pricing as "CS = @C@S
S
C
and "CG = @C@G
G
C
; both elasticites are non-negative.
The two last terms in squared brackets on the (near) right-hand side are the net
e¤ective after-tax marginal costs of using the intermediate input S to shift prot. If they
cancel out, the rst-order condition reduces to FBS = q, and the use of the intermediate
input S is not a¤ected by prot shifting due to di¤erences in international tax rates. For
this to happen, the weighted increase in concealment costs that follows from generating
more tax savings by a higher transfer price (G  @C
@G
) must be equal the weighted increase
in concealment costs from employing more units of the intermediate production factor
(S  @C
@S
). Put di¤erently, transfer pricing has real e¤ects on rm behavior, if and only if
the concealment-cost elasticities of input manipulation and trade mispricing di¤er from
each other:
 G
S
@C
@G
+
@C
@S
6= 0 , "CS 6= "CG: (7)
We conclude12
Proposition 1 Transfer pricing does not a¤ect investment and real activity of multina-
tional rms if the total concealment costs of transfer pricing imply that the concealment-
cost elasticities of input manipulation and trade mispricing are identical.
In the next section, we explore the relationship between the two terms in equation
(7) in depth and begin in section 3.1 with a case for which Proposition 1 is fullled.
3 Variable concealment costs and rmsreal activity
In the literature on personal income taxation, for example, Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
Yitzhaki (1987) and more recently Kleven et al. (2011), the probability of detection is
an increasing function of undeclared income.13 In our setting, that approach corresponds
to the situation where nes and the probability of being detected depend on the amount
12Proposition 1 has an analogy to the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem, which states that a tax on capital
should be zero under certain conditions because the capital tax just exactly reproduces the labor tax, but
distorts intertemporal consumption (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). In our case, the parallel is that the
MNC should never manipulate its factor demand in order to shift prot income if the concealment-cost
elasticities of input manipulation and trade mispricing are identical. The reason is that such manipu-
lation would trigger the same concealment costs as pure mispricing, but in addition lead to production
ine¢ ciency.
13In Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the probability of an audit is actually modelled as a decreasing
function of declared income. For given pre-tax income (as in their model), this setup fully corresponds
to the modelling in the other papers.
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of prots shifted, i.e., P = G  S. Implementing a structure such as in Yitzhaki (1974)
would imply that the detection probability should depend on evaded tax payments. In our
model, this will not change any of our results as can be seen immediately from adjusting
the denition of P to P 0 = tB G  S (and recalculating equations (9) and (10) below).
An alternative would, however, be to base detection on the OECD arms length prin-
ciple, so that the detection is an increasing function of the deviation from the true price
of the good. This approach was used by Kant (1988) and is standard in the literature
focusing on concealment e¤ort instead of expected nes (cf. Hauer and Schjelderup,
2000; Grubert, 2003; and Nielsen et al., 2010).
3.1 Concealment costs based on the amount of prots shifted
If the cost of concealing transfer pricing depends on the amount of prots shifted, the
concealment-cost function can be written as
C(G;S; c; d; l) = C(P; c; d; l) = e(c; l) + p(P; c; d)(P ); (8)
where C(P; c; d; l) is convex in prots shifted and P = G S.14 Inserting for P in equation
(8), taking derivatives, we obtain
@C
@G
= [pP (P; c; d)(P ) + p(P; c; d)
0(P )]S; (9)
@C
@S
= [pP (P; c; d)(P ) + p(P; c; d)
0(P )]G: (10)
Substituting these derivatives into equation (7), we nd that the two terms cancel, as
@C
@S
=
G
S
@C
@G
: (11)
The reason why the two terms cancel is that both the tax savings and the e¤ective
marginal concealment costs from manipulating either the intermediate good (S) or the
transfer price (G) are identical. However, using S to shift prot causes an additional
e¢ ciency loss in production that makes it optimal to only use G for prot shifting.
We may now state:
Proposition 2 When the cost of concealing transfer pricing depends on the amount of
14This cost structure also corresponds (or comes very close, at least) to the so-called comparable-
prot methodproposed by the OECD (cf. OECD, 2010; Gresik and Osmundsen, 2008) if we, for in-
stance, rely on a comparison of the protability ratio (before taxes and nes) between the upstream
and the downstream a¢ liates (that is, 
A
Be
= GSF (K;S) (q+G)S RK e(c;l) ) to the ratio between unre-
lated rms in these markets. Note that due to our assumption of linear production technology in
the upstream market, unrelated rms will have zero prots and the detection probability will read
p = p( GSF (K;S) (q+G)S RK e(c;l) ; c; d). Taking derivatives, applying the denition of concealment costs C
and inserting into condition (6) for optimal S implies FS = q.
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undeclared tax bases (or tax payments evaded), the transfer price a¤ects neither the use
of the intermediate input S nor capital investments KB:
The proof of this proposition consists of using (11) in (6), where it is seen that the
transfer price does not a¤ect economic activity of the MNC.
3.2 Concealment costs based on the deviation from the arms-
length price
In the subsection above, we have assumed the probability of detection and concealment
e¤ort to depend on the amount of prots shifted. An alternative would be to let the sum
of concealment costs (ne and e¤ort) depend on the di¤erence between the declared price
and the true price (or market price). According to the OECD guidelines, the true price
is the price that would have been negotiated between unrelated parties.15 As a proxy, it
is represented by q in our model (assuming perfect competition). The implication of this
approach is that a large price deviation from the true transfer price can be very costly
for the rm even if the total amount of prot shifted may be small, whereas a small price
deviation is not costly even if a large amount of prot is shifted.
In order to facilitate an analysis based on the arms length principle, we assume that
the probability of being detected depends on the deviation from the true price, that is,
G, but that the ne depends on total prots shifted P .
Given these assumptions, the concealment cost function C is given by
C(G;S; c; d; l) = e(c; l) + p(G; c; d)(P ); (12)
where P = GS as before. The marginal concealment costs are now given by
@C
@G
= pG(G; c; d)(P ) + p(G; c; d)
0(P )S; (13)
@C
@S
= p(G; c; d)0(P )G: (14)
Substituting these derivatives into equation (7), we nd
 G
S
@C
@G
+
@C
@S
=  G
S
pG(G; c; d)(P ) < 0: (15)
Using equation (15) in the rst-order condition for the optimal use of S, we obtain
FBS = q  
G
S
pG(G; c; d)(P ) < q: (16)
15Among several characteristics for such a comparison, the most prominent one is the comparable
uncontrolled price(CUP) method that implies observing and drawing on the price charged on equiv-
alent trades with non-related third parties. See OECD (2010). Gresik and Osmundsen (2008) provide
institutional details and an economic analysis of alternative transfer pricing methods.
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We thus have:16
Proposition 3 When the probability of detection focuses on deviations from the true
arms-length price and places no emphasis on prots shifted, abusive transfer pricing has
real e¤ects on the use of the input good (S) and investments (K) :
Inspection of equation (16) shows that transfer pricing leads to more of the intermedi-
ate good S being shipped, because achieving extra tax savings now is comparably cheaper
via raising S than via increasing G, as only the latter will lead to a higher probability of
detection.17 Since transfer pricing changes the use of S, it is clear that transfer pricing
also a¤ects K, because the marginal productivity of capital depends on the level of S,
see equation (3).
When concealment costs predominantly depend on the deviation from the arms-
length price, it is protable for the MNC to use both G and S to shift prot to the tax
haven a¢ liate. The reason is that increasing S allows the MNC to reduce concealment
costs by lowering G (all else equal). Together with an increased use of the intermediate
good S, demand for capital goes up and production increases in the high-tax country if
inputs K and S are complements, i.e., if @2F (K;S)=(@K@S) > 0. If, in contrast, inputs
are substitutes, @2F (K;S)=(@K@S) < 0; the e¤ect on rm activity is ambiguous, since
K would fall, while S would inrease.
When we have complementarity, the increase in the use of S mitigates the under-
utilization of capital that follows from the lack of tax deductibility of equity (confer eq.
(3). This is an e¤ect that reduces the tax wedge on capital investments, but it should be
interpreted with caution. It is too hasty to conclude that transfer pricing implies that
economic e¢ ciency is improved. The reason is that the use of the intermediate factor S
to shift prots carries both concealment and e¢ ciency costs that counteract the rise in
production.
To see this, consider the case of a tax on economic prots only (full deductibility of
all capital costs or complete nancing with tax deductible debt). The incentive to shift
prots implies an increase in S that only triggers overinvestment and concealment costs.
Manipulating the transfer price now clearly leads to ine¢ cient production.18
16The result in the Proposition will be further strengthened if concealment costs are dened over the
price deviation (and e¤ort) only, that is, C(G; c; d; l) = e(c; l) + p(G; c; d)(G) and @C=@S = 0. Note
as well that dening costs of concealment e¤ort e = e(c; l) also over GS, respectively G will have no
qualitative e¤ect on any of the results in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
17The tendency to raise S will eventually be counteracted by increasing ine¢ ciency in production.
18There could, of course, be (unexplained) reasons for taxation of capital at the rate tB , such as
distributional concerns or income shifting between labor and capital income.
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4 E¤ects of higher detection e¤ort and increased tax-
law quality
In this section, we focus on the case of concealment costs being based on the amount
of prots shifted (cf. section 3.1). First, the comparative-static analysis conrms the
ndings on non-a¤ected economic activity, because we derive19
dS
dtA
=
dS
dd
=
dS
dl
= 0; and
dS
dtB
=  

FKS
FKKFSS   F 2KS

R
(1  tB)2 :
Neither detection e¤ort d nor tax-law quality l or the tax rate tA in the tax haven a¤ect
the optimal demand for the intermediate good. The domestic tax rate tB a¤ects the
intermediate good only via the capital tax distortion from denying tax deductibility for
costs of equity. Since production is not a¤ected by transfer pricing, any government
measures to reduce transfer pricing will not reduce output. Hence, governments can ght
against prot shifting without experiencing (negative) investment e¤ects.
However, ghting against prot shifting via increased detection e¤ort by the tax au-
thorities cuts both ways and the nal e¤ect on prots shifted is ambiguous since dS=dd = 0
and
dG
dd
=   CPd  
CPc
Ccc
Ccd
S 

CPP   CPcCcc CPc
 ? 0; (17)
dc
dd
=   1
Ccc

CPc  S  dG
dd
+ Ccd

=   1
Ccc
CcdCPP   CPcCPd
CPP   CPcCcc CPc
? 0; (18)
where CPd etc. refer to double derivatives of the concealment cost function C, and
Ccd; CPc < 0, but CPP ; CPd > 0. (The relation between derivatives of C with respect to
P on one hand and with respect to G and S on the other is made clear in the appendix.)
A higher detection e¤ort ceteris paribus makes it more attractive to invest into concealing
since the reduction in expected nes increases. At the same time, the higher detection
e¤ort has a negative direct e¤ect on overpricing G. If G falls, that gives a negative
incentive for concealment e¤ort c; however, if c increases that gives a boost to overpricing.
Hence, both e¤ects are ambiguous and it is likely that the nal outcome of higher detection
e¤ort is a larger waste of resources on increased concealment e¤ort while the intended
reduction in prot shifting is at least moderated.
Therefore, the preferable choice is to write a consistent tax law without loopholes.
A higher tax-law quality makes concealment more di¢ cult and expensive and by that
reduces concealment e¤ort. Less concealment e¤ort will increase the e¤ective detection
19See the appendix for an explicit derivation of all expressions to come in this section.
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probability and via this e¤ect reduce overpricing and prot shifting. Formally, we nd
dG
dl
=
S
u
CPc
Ccc
ecl < 0; (19)
because u = CGG   CGcCcc CcG > 0, CPc < 0 and Ccc; ecl > 0. The e¤ect of the law quality
on concealment e¤ort can be signed as
dc
dl
=   1
Ccc

CPc  S  dG
dl
+ ecl

< 0; (20)
as again CPc < 0 and Ccc; ecl > 0 and dGdl < 0. Consequently, a better quality of
tax law unambiguously reduces both transfer pricing and the (unproductive) activity of
concealing the mispricing of the intermediate good.
We summarize
Proposition 4 Investing in higher quality of tax law unambiguously reduces transfer
pricing and dampens wasteful concealment activity. In contrast, more investment in de-
tection e¤ort spurs wasteful concealment activity and has an ambiguous e¤ect on prot
shifting.
Proposition 4 has some empirical support. Lohse and Riedel (2013) study whether
countries that strengthened their transfer pricing regulation in the tax code experience less
prot shifting. They base their study on European panel data from 26 countries over the
last decade. A main nding is that in countries that have tightened or introduced tougher
transfer pricing documentation requirements, prot shifting is signicantly reduced.20
Their nding is in line with other studies that consider the e¤ect of a stricter tax law.
For example, Büttner et al. (2012) show that thin-capitalization rules reduce prot
shifting by interest deductions, whilst Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) nd evidence for
that controlled-foreign-company regulations are e¤ective in reducing passive investments
in low-tax countries.
5 Some concluding remarks
A transaction between related parties requires a transfer price to be set. In general,
governments demand this price to be consistent with the price that would have been
paid by unrelated rms, that is, an arms length price. As shown here, an a¢ liate
in a low-tax jurisdiction has an incentive to charge an articially high price on sales
to its sister entity in a high-tax country, and vice versa. The OECD transfer pricing
20Lohse and Riedel (2013) do not nd empirical support for that advanced pricing agreements (APA)
curb prot shifting. Under an APA agreement the rm and the tax authorities agree up-front on the
transfer price. Such arrangements reduce the risk of the transfer price being adjusted later.
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guidelines, along with those tax jurisdictions that have adopted the same principles,
allow multinationals to choose from several approaches in determining reasonable transfer
prices. Among the most common approaches are: (i) The comparable uncontrolled price
method (CUP); (ii) the resale price method; and (iii) the cost plus method. Under
CUP, the tax authorities compare the transaction with identical or similar transactions
between independent trading parties. The resale price method is often used, if a product
sold between related parties is subsequently resold to an unrelated party. Finally, the
cost plus method adds a (customary) prot mark-up to the cost of producing a good. In
practice, multinational enterprises adhere to these guidelines to a greater or lesser extent
and risk triggering inspection from tax authorities, followed by a correction of the price
and possibly a ne.
In this paper, we have examined the link between inspection policy and multinational
rm behavior. Specically we have considered a couple of di¤erent formulations of the
probability of detection of prot shifting by transfer pricing, and we have analyzed how
they a¤ect investment and input use. We have shown that if the probability of an audit
depends on the size of the deviation from the arms-length price as approximated by the
comparable uncontrolled price(CUP) method, the rms use of production factors will
be distorted. In contrast, if the basis for control and the probability of an audit depend
on the amount evaded (prot shifted) and is oriented at the comparable prot method,
the use of production factors remains una¤ected by transfer pricing and di¤erences in
national tax systems. For tax authorities, it will be less expensive to combat prot
shifting by using a prot measure since it avoids undesirable side e¤ects on multinational
production activity.
Furthermore, we have shown that there is something to be said for ghting prot
shifting by improving the tax law so that less room is left for inconsistency and tax
loopholes. Such better tax-law quality unambiguously reduces prot shifting and wasteful
concealment e¤ort. More investment in detection e¤ort by the tax authorities, instead,
fosters concealment e¤ort, has a (theoretically) ambiguous e¤ect on prot shifting and
leads to a more wasteful use of resources.
The policy recommendation that follows from our analysis are therefore to make
audits contingent on how much prot is shifted because this imposes less of a distortion
on production e¢ ciency. Further, consider improving the quality of tax law in order to
shut down loopholes as a complement to a sound auditing policy.
One caveat applies, however: The analysis in the paper featured a centralized MNC,
and the sole purpose of transfer pricing in the MNC was to delimit taxable incomes in the
two a¢ liates. If decision making in the MNC instead were decentralized, transfer pricing
would in addition become an instrument for delegation of decision power to a¢ liates.21
21Nielsen et al. (2008) demonstrate that if tax minimization is really important for the MNC (because
of bit tax di¤erences), the best option is to stay centralized; decentralization may be superior, if tax
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As long as two (sets of) transfer prices were utilized, one for delegation and another for
taxation, the gist of the analysis above might well go through. According to a number of
surveys, however, many MNCs only use one book, one set of transfer prices. In this case,
overinvoicing the intermediate good by the headquarters could trigger negative e¤ects on
the investment decision at a¢ liate level. More generally, transfer pricing for tax purposes
might collide with decentralized decision making (see, e.g., Smith, 2002; Nielsen and
Raimondos-Møller, 2012). In such cases, implementing the CUP method could be advan-
tageous, because it could mitigate the decentralization-related underinvestment e¤ect.22
These issues will have to be left for future work.
A Comparative statics
To avoid confusion in the notation to come, let us dene the concealment cost function
as C = X(G;S; c; d; l) and label the second derivative taken for variables i and j as
Xij =
@2X
@i@j
. The rst-order conditions for optimal rm behavior can be summarized and
transformed into
FK(K;S)  R
1  tB = 0; (21)
FS(K;S)  q + tB   tA
1  tB G 
@X(G;S; c; d; l)
@S
= 0; (22)
tB   tA
1  tB  S  
@X(G;S; c; d; l)
@G
= 0; (23)
@X(G;S; c; d; l)
@c
= 0: (24)
Totally di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions leads to
FKKdK + FKSdS   dR
1  tB  
R
(1  tB)2dtB = 0; (25)
FKSdK + (FSS  XSS) dS +

tB   tA
1  tB  XSG

dG XScdc
 dq + G(1  tA)
(1  tB)2 dtB  
G
1  tB dtA  XSddd XSldl = 0; (26)
tB   tA
1  tB  XGS

dS  XGGdG XGcdc
+
S(1  tA)
(1  tB)2 dtB  
S
1  tB dtA  XGddd XGldl = 0 (27)
XcSdS +XcGdG+Xccdc+Xcddd+Xcldl = 0: (28)
manipulation is a lesser concern.
22We are grateful to Chris Heady for drawing our attention to this issue.
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From equation (28), we can infer
dc =   1
Xcc
[XcSdS +XcGdG+Xcddd+Xcldl] : (29)
Substituting that expression into equation (27) delivers after some rearrangements
dG =
1
u

tB   tA
1  tB  XGS +
XGc
Xcc
XcS

dS +
S(1  tA)
(1  tB)2 dtB  
S
1  tB dtA
 

XGd   XGc
Xcc
Xcd

dd 

XGl   XGc
Xcc
Xcl

dl

; (30)
where u = XGG   XGcXccXcG. Moreover, by manipulating equation (25), we can extract
dK =  FKS
FKK
dS +
1
FKK
dR
1  tB +
1
FKK
R
(1  tB)2dtB: (31)
Inserting now the terms in equations (29), (30) and (31) into equation (26) and using
Xij = Xji, we obtain an explicit solution for the comparative-static e¤ects on the use of
the intermediate good S:"
FSS  XSS   F
2
KS
FKK
+
1
u

tB   tA
1  tB  XGS +
XGc
Xcc
XcS
2
+
X2cS
Xcc
#
dS = v  dS =
 FKS
FKK
dR
1  tB + dq  
1
(1  tB)2

FKSR
FKK
+G+
S
u

tB   tA
1  tB  XSG +
XGc
Xcc
XSc

dtB
+
1
1  tB

G+
S
u

tB   tA
1  tB  XSG +
XGc
Xcc
XSc

dtA (32)
+

XSd +
1
u

XGd   XGc
Xcc
Xcd

tB   tA
1  tB  XSG +
XGc
Xcc
XSc

  XSc
Xcc
Xcd

dd
+

XSl +
1
u

XGl   XGc
Xcc
Xcl

tB   tA
1  tB  XSG +
XGc
Xcc
XSc

  XSc
Xcc
Xcl

dl;
where v = FSS XSS  F
2
KS
FKK
+ 1
u

tB tA
1 tB  XGS +
XGc
Xcc
XcS
2
+
X2cS
Xcc
< 0 (from second-order
conditions). Furthermore, it must be u = XGG   XGcXccXcG > 0.
A.1 The case of shifted prots as basis for detection
Assume in this subsection that C = X(G;S; c; d; l) = X(P; c; d; l) with P = G  S. We
then have
XG = XP  S ) XGG = XPP  S2; XGS = XPP GS +XP = XSG; XGc = XPc  S;
XS = XP G ) XSS = XPP G2; XSc = XPc G:
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Inserting these expressions into equation (32) and collecting terms delivers
v  dS =  FKS
FKK
dR
1  tB + dq  

FKS
FKK

R  dtB
(1  tB)2 +
S
u

tB   tA
1  tB  XP

| {z }
=0 from FOC
dtA
1  tB
+
GS2
u

XPd   XPd
Xcc
Xcd

XPP   X
2
Pc
Xcc
+
X2Pc
Xcc
 XPP

| {z }
=0
dd
+
GS2
u

XPl   XPl
Xcc
Xcl

XPP   X
2
Pc
Xcc
+
X2Pc
Xcc
 XPP

| {z }
=0
dl
=  FKS
FKK
dR
1  tB + dq  

FKS
FKK

R  dtB
(1  tB)2 : (33)
Moreover, the expressions enable simplication of v to
v = F 2KS=FKK   FSS (34)
Equation (33) shows that transfer pricing does not a¤ect factor allocation and economic
activity. The use of the intermediate input good is independent of the tax rate tA in the
tax haven as well as of detection e¤ort by tax authorities d and the quality of tax law l.
The domestic tax rate tB a¤ects the intermediate good only via the capital tax distortion
from denying tax deductibility for costs of equity.
Let us specify the concealments cost now as C = X(P; c; d; l) = e(c; l)+p(P; d
c
) (P )
so that we have XPl = 0 and remember that Xcl = ecl > 0. Applying these specications
together with dS
dl
= 0 in equation (30), we can show that
dG
dl
=
S
u
XPc
Xcc
Xcl < 0; (35)
because XPc < 0 and Xcc; Xcl > 0. Making use of (35) in equation (29), we can sign the
e¤ect of law quality on concealment e¤ort as
dc
dl
=   1
Xcc

XPc  S  dG
dl
+Xcl

< 0; (36)
as again XPc < 0 and Xcc; Xcl > 0 and dGdl < 0. Consequently, a better quality of tax law
unambiguously reduces transfer pricing and the (unproductive) activity of concealing the
mispricing of the intermediate good.
For an increase in the detection e¤ort of tax authorities, we do not nd a clear-cut
result, and specifying the concealment cost function does not help much. A compact
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presentation of results, collecting e¤ects from equations (30) and (29) would be
dG
dd
=   XPd  
XPc
Xcc
Xcd
S 

XPP   XPcXccXPc
 ? 0; (37)
dc
dd
=   1
Xcc

XPc  S  dG
dd
+Xcd

=   1
Xcc
XcdXPP  XPcXPd
XPP   XPcXccXPc
? 0; (38)
where Xcd; XPc < 0 but XPP ; XPd > 0. Higher detection e¤ort ceteris paribus makes it
more attractive to invest into concealing since the reduction in expected nes increases.
At the same time, higher detection e¤ort has a negative direct e¤ect on overpricing G.
If G is reduced, that gives a negative incentive for concealment e¤ort c; however, if c
increases, that gives a boost to overpricing. Hence, both e¤ects are ambiguous.
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